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The “Covenant” embodied the idea of a contract for peace in 1919. The “Charter” of 1945 
appeared more boldly to embody a world constitution for peace. This article analyses 
the United Nations and its predecessor organisation, the League of Nations, to demon-
strate how each organisation was primarily a product of the conflict that preceded it 
and how each captured the post-war status quo. Despite this shared backward-looking 
aspect, both treaties were sufficiently broad to accommodate significant constitution-
al developments with the potential to shape the collective security systems to meet 
changing geopolitical conditions. Members of the League failed to seize this opportu-
nity but the promise of an improved collective security system, moreover one based 
on fundamental laws, offered by the drafters of the Charter, is found to be problematic. 
The transference of competence from member states to organisation that marked the 
transition from League to UN, which, when combined with the legalisation of hierar-
chy by the Charter, have meant that the UN order, despite appearing to be more obvi-
ously constitutionalised, was potentially less able to achieve peace through law than 
its predecessor.
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1 Introduction
The “Covenant” of the League of Nations embodied the idea of a contract for 
peace agreed by the victorious powers at the end of the first global conflict 
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in 1919. The “Charter” of the United Nations, adopted at the end of the sec-
ond global conflict in 1945, appeared more boldly to embody a world consti-
tution for peace. This article analyses the United Nations and its predecessor 
organisation, the League of Nations, to demonstrate how, despite the visions 
of a future world order aired prior to the adoption of their constituent trea-
ties, each organisation was primarily a product of the conflict that preceded 
it signifying that both treaties were primarily drafted to tackle the security cri-
ses that preceded their creation. Furthermore, each organisation captured the 
post-war status quo as shaped by the experiences of the devastating conflicts 
that preceded their creation. Nonetheless, both treaties were sufficiently broad 
to accommodate significant constitutional development with the potential to 
shape collective security systems to meet changing geopolitical conditions. 
However, the promise of an improved collective security system, moreover 
one based on fundamental laws, offered by the drafters of the Charter, is found 
to be problematic. The transference of competence from member states to 
organisation that marked the transition from League to UN, when combined 
with the legalisation of hierarchy by the Charter, meant that the UN order, 
despite appearing to be more obviously constitutionalised, was potentially less 
able to deliver collective security, more broadly to achieve peace through law, 
than its predecessor.
2 Visions of Peace
The celebrated Victorian poet Alfred Lord Tennyson is famous for showing 
both the glory and futility of war in “The Charge of the Light Brigade” by the 
British light cavalry in the Crimean War of 1854. However, in one of his earlier 
poems “Locksley Hall” of 1837 the poet showed a clearer aversion to war when 
he “… dipt into the future, far as human eye could see”, and “saw the vision of 
the world, and all the wonders that would be”; where “the war-drum throbb’d 
no longer, and the battle flags were furl’d”, in the “Parliament of Man, the fed-
eration of the world”. “There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful 
realm in awe, and the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law”.1 The 
vision, some eighty years before the League came into being, was of universal 
organisation bringing peace through universal law.
There were elements of this vision in the outlines of international organ-
isation that started to emerge from the speeches of US President Woodrow 
1   Interestingly, cited in the introduction to Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, 
Present and Future of the United Nations (2006).
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Wilson during the First World War. In a speech made shortly before Britain 
began its offensive on the Somme in May 1916, Wilson started to outline his rad-
ical vision of a world order in which a “feasible association of nations” would 
ensure the “right” of “every people to choose the sovereignty under which 
they shall live”.2 A form of international organisation to regulate and protect 
the right to self-determination for peoples was combined with respect for the 
more orthodox principle of sovereign equality in Wilson’s various speeches 
and writings. Wilson’s vision of there being an end to the Great War on the 
basis of “Peace without Victory”, meaning that the war should be brought to 
an end with both sides agreeing terms on the basis of sovereign equality rather 
than fighting on in pursuit of a clear victory, was cemented in a speech to the 
US Senate of 22 January 1917. This peace would be “made secure by the orga-
nized major force of mankind”, which was to be based not on a “balance of 
power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized 
common peace”.3
Nonetheless, his January 1917 vision of the League as a “community of 
power” was modified by Point 14 of his famous Fourteen Points a year later 
in January 1918, which contained a more orthodox commitment to a “general 
association of nations … formed under specific covenants for the purposes of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small states alike”.4 This suggested that his previous vision of a 
“community of power” had been replaced by a template for a more orthodox 
web of covenants or contracts between sovereign equals that would represent 
a clearer continuation of the pre-1914 international legal order, albeit with a 
new universal layer of what McNair termed “a kind of public law transcending 
in kind and not merely in degree the ordinary agreements between states”.5
The first draft of the Covenant that appeared in February 1919 was declared 
by Wilson as a “living thing” and as a “constitution of peace, not as a League of 
War”.6 However, he had to return to the Commission in March 1919 to propose 
changes to the draft Covenant, effectively concessions to state sovereignty, in 
order to try to persuade Congress. These changes were primarily the inclusion 
of a withdrawal clause, an exclusion of matters within a member’s domestic 
2   New Willard Hotel Speech to the League to Enforce Peace, 27 May 1916.
3   Available at: http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~ppennock/doc-Wilsonpeace.htm (last 
accessed on 28 January 2020).
4   Bob Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day 
(2009) pp. 184–6.
5   Arnold D. McNair, “The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties”, 11 British Year 
Book of International Law (1930) pp. 100, 101, 112.
6   Ruth Henig, The League of Nations (2010) p. 38.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/22/2020 08:12:22AM
via free access
313From Covenant to Charter
International Community Law Review 22 (2020) 310–330
jurisdiction, and recognition of regional understandings such as the Monroe 
Doctrine.7 Despite these changes, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
remained of the opinion that had such a treaty existed in the summer of 1914, 
war would not have broken out as political leaders would have been forced to 
discuss and resolve their differences by the processes and machinery of the 
League.8 Nevertheless, there was an indication that leaders were of the opin-
ion that a procedural approach would not stop a government set on a long-
term policy of aggression.9
Lloyd George’s understanding of the League suggests he saw it as achiev-
ing peace through legal procedures, rather than any change in the substan-
tive law. This will be shown to be too shallow an analysis of the League, but 
it raises the question of how peace could be achieved, moreover, how this 
might be done on the basis of law. The importance of law to peace will be seen 
throughout the following analysis, but it is useful at this point to highlight the 
view of Hans Kelsen, writing in 1944 before any draft of the UN Charter had 
emerged, but with the experience of the League to draw upon. Kelsen argued 
that “the solution of the problem of a durable peace can only be sought within 
the framework of international law”, otherwise states would continue to be 
judges in their own cause, deciding when it was in their interests to wage war. 
Furthermore, it was essential to remove that judgement from states to an inde-
pendent organisation. However, Kelsen argued that peace through law could 
not be achieved through the political organs of an organisation. He points to 
the experience of the League of Nations: “[t]his union of States, which is so 
far the biggest international community to secure international peace, has 
failed completely”. He pointed to a “fatal fault of its construction”, namely that 
“the authors of the Covenant placed at the centre of this international organi-
zation not the Permanent Court of International Justice, but a kind of inter-
national government, the Council of the League of Nations”.10 Kelsen cites a 
speech made by Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons 
in May 1944 when he stated that: “We intend to set up a world order and an or-
ganisation equipped with all the necessary attributes of power in order to pre-
vent future wars or the planning of them in advance by restless and ambitious 
Nations”. The structure would reflect that of the League but the new organisa-
tion would be backed by “overwhelming military power”.11 Kelsen argued that 
7    Ibid., p. 40.
8    Ibid., p. 43.
9    Ibid., p. 44.
10   Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944) pp. 13, 49.
11   Ibid., p. 67.
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“the more effective the power conferred upon the international organization, 
the more guarantees which must be given by its constitution that this power 
will be exercised only for the maintenance of the law; and the only serious 
guarantee for the legal exercise of power is the provision that the armed forces 
at the disposal” of the organisation “is to be employed not at the order of a 
political body but in execution of the decision of a court”.12
The idea that peace through law could only be achieved by ensuring that an 
International Court would decide on any dispute or conflict and direct the ap-
plication of community power in the form of sanctions (economic or military) 
to address any recalcitrant losing state has undoubted attraction for the rule 
of law, but it fails to recognise the embodiment of political power that both 
the Covenant and Charter would encapsulate. In contrast to Kelsen’s posi-
tion, the question then becomes whether peace through law is possible within 
an organisation dominated by political organs. The genesis of the UN in the 
Declaration of the United Nations of 1 January 1942 showed the desire to en-
sure that the organisation to replace the League would have to be able to tackle 
the sort of aggressions that led to the Second World War, and that, contrary to 
Kelsen’s argument, it would be an executive model of collective security.
President Truman’s speech to the final plenary session of the United Nations 
Conference at San Francisco in 1945 showed concern both with the past and 
with taking action to prevent such catastrophes from happening again – “if we 
had this Charter a few years ago – and above all, the will to use it – millions 
now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, 
millions now living will surely die”. Furthermore, he spoke of the need “for a 
good peace, a lasting peace”, in which the “decent peoples of the earth must re-
main determined to strike down the evil spirit which has hung over the world 
for the last decade”; and that while the Axis powers had failed (though Japan 
was yet to surrender at this point) “they will try again”.13
Addressing the problems of the past was, however, balanced by other state-
ments showing that the Charter would be capable of being relevant in the fu-
ture, moreover, on the basis of both law and action. First, a belief in progress: 
President Truman spoke about the “continuity of history” with the Charter 
representing the realisation of the vision of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Secondly, a recognition of the Charter as a constitution 
(“a charter for peace”) with comparisons made to the US constitution: “this 
charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time 
12   Ibid.
13   In Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (2003) 
pp. 289–94.
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goes on”. Third, a preview of later constitutional normative development with 
the expectation of “the framing of an international bill of rights”, which “will 
be as much a part of international life as our own bill of rights is a part of our 
Constitution” – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1948. In a strange way, President Truman’s closing sen-
tence echoes the dreams of Alfred Lord Tennyson: “Let us not fail to grasp this 
supreme chance to establish a world-wide rule of reason – to create an endur-
ing peace under the guidance of God”.14
3 Drafting to Maintain the Sovereignty of the Major Powers
Despite the rhetoric of American Presidents Wilson and Truman, the draft-
ing of both the Covenant and the Charter demonstrated that law and justice 
were to be subject to power especially as embodied in the sovereignty of the 
major powers. Nonetheless, in some ways the Covenant could claim to embody 
a stronger version of “peace through law” than the Charter. In the preamble 
of the Covenant, the stated purposes of achieving international cooperation 
and peace and security were to be achieved by: accepting “obligations not to 
resort to war”; having “open, just and honourable relations between nations”; 
establishing “understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct 
among Governments”; and by a “scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations”. 
These commitments were explained by: the vestiges of Wilsonian idealism 
that remained in the final draft; the belief that correct and open legal proce-
dures would have prevented the outbreak of the Great War; the Covenant’s 
accurate reflection of the inter-state nature of international law; and finally 
the Covenant’s position as part of a settlement which was not premised on 
a totally vanquished enemy. Although the Treaty of Versailles became noto-
rious for reparations imposed on Germany,15 it was premised on respect for 
Germany as a nation state,16 albeit Germany’s period of membership of the 
League only lasted from 1926–1933. In contrast, the total defeat of Germany at 
the end of the Second World War led to its dismemberment, a condition that 
prevailed until the end of the Cold War. The Covenant had respect for sover-
eign equality at its heart, at least amongst independent sovereign states, while 
the UN Charter, despite the primacy given to sovereign equality in Article 2(1), 
14   Ibid.
15   Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order (2015) p. 249.
16   Ibid., p. 272.
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was premised on Great Power supremacy and the complete defeat and rebuild-
ing of the “enemy” states in the liberal democratic mould.17
However, the law in the Covenant was based on sovereign equality and racial 
inequality. Wilson’s radical liberalism was tainted by a belief in the supremacy 
of “white civilization”,18 one that prevented the adoption of a universal norm 
of self-determination for colonial countries and peoples. From Wilson’s per-
spective Germany was fighting to gain an empire, while the UK and France 
were fighting to keep theirs.19 The First World War was in part a battle to con-
tinue empires, a dispute over their ownership; it was not a dispute to remove 
that model, at least until President Wilson became involved. However, even his 
famous Fourteen Points of January 1918 did not contain a clear declaration of 
democracy and self-determination for all, rather a “gradated view of the capac-
ity for self-government that was typical of nineteenth-century liberalism”.20
In this way Wilson shared a vision of the “civilizing” mission of white peo-
ples with Britain, France and the South African statesman (and member of 
the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919), Jan Smuts, who 
was very influential in shaping both the Covenant and the UN Charter.21 It 
followed that any collective security system would have to accommodate, 
possibly support, empire. In 1917 Smuts had argued for a Commonwealth of 
Nations to emerge from the British Empire, which he described as the “only 
successful experiment in international government”, making it clear that the 
“Commonwealth” would be a continuation of empire, albeit an enlightened 
one, where dependent peoples would be under the tutelage of democratic ci-
vilised nations.22 Smuts embodied the view that rejected the autocratic military 
imperialism of Germany in favour of a liberal form of imperialism offered by 
Britain. It was that view which eventually prevailed, not only in the Covenant 
in 1919 but, arguably, also in the UN Charter of 1945,23 at least until empires 
began to collapse and the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
Decolonisation of 1960.24 In 1919 the “British Empire had never been so large, 
and much of this was thanks to the new international organization that Smuts 
17   See the enemy states clauses in Articles 52, 77 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations 
1945.
18   Tooze, supra note 15, p. 92.
19   Ibid., p. 45.
20   Ibid., p. 121.
21   Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (2009) p. 9.
22   Ibid., pp. 37–45.
23   Ibid., pp. 63–5.
24   UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (1960).
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had been so influential in bringing into being”.25 The creation of the UN in 1945 
did not disturb this. Mazower notes that the “UN’s later embrace of anticolo-
nialism … has tended to obscure the fact that like the League it was a product 
of empire and indeed, at least at the outset, regarded by those with colonies to 
keep as a more than adequate mechanism for its defense”.26
Britain and France gained both Ottoman and German territories in the set-
tlement at the end of the Great War, albeit as mandatories rather than colo-
nial powers, but as the history of colonialism shows there were many forms of 
colonialism,27 and the mandatory model fitted easily within the range. While 
the preservation of empire by international organisation did not change in 
1945, with colonies being unaffected by the International Trusteeship System 
and Trusteeship Council put in place in Chapters XII and XIII of the UN 
Charter, the hegemonic capabilities of colonial states were weakened so that 
they were no longer able to sustain their empires for much longer after the end 
of the War.
The sovereignty protected by the Covenant of 1919, and continued by the 
Charter of 1945, had been firmly embedded in international law as articulated 
by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas case of 1928. In that seminal case, sover-
eignty “in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the 
exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State”, signifying that in the 19th 
century “most parts of the globe were under the sovereignty of States members 
of the community of nations, and that territories without master had become 
relatively few”.28 That community of privileged nations was in effective institu-
tionalized in the League, moreover, remained untouched by the UN Charter.29
The Covenant of the League of Nations was an attempt to re-shape the 
world order after 1918 but, as Gregor Dallas writes: “[s]tep back into the Europe 
of 1918 and one is astonished by how much of the old world still stands”.30 
Whatever vision prevailed, the League was to be central to it and would either 
serve to protect the status quo (the vision of UK and France); or to change 
that (the vision of US). Wilson’s vision was gradually revealed to be primarily 
about the assertion of the US version of liberal capitalism based on an “open 
door”, which envisaged independent states with open markets and therefore 
open to influence, rather than an absolute assertion of self-determination and 
25   Mazower, supra note 21, p. 46.
26   Ibid., p. 17.
27   Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919.
28   Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 RIAA p. 829.
29   Mazower, supra note 21, p. 17.
30   Gregor Dallas, 1918: War and Peace (2000) p. 24.
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democracy.31 In its final form the primary purpose of the Covenant was not 
to upset the old order but to prevent it descending into brutal violence once 
again. Lloyd George boasted that the Covenant “was really a British production 
although fathered by President Wilson”.32
The League was constructed to address the type of diplomatic, political, 
and legal blunders that led to the First World War, not the sort of deliberate, 
hegemonic aggression that led to the Second. The UN was borne out of the 
alliance that defeated the Axis powers, an executive model with a great deal 
of centralised sanctioning power put into the hands of its primary organ. 
The UN Charter appeared so much more constitutionally and institutionally 
developed and “action”-oriented than its predecessor. At the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945 the Soviet delegate stated that one of the characteristics of 
the Security Council “was that actions should be fast and effective”, pointing to 
the disastrous “effects of the suddenness of enemy action during the present 
war”.33 Smaller states agreed to such a concentration of power on the basis 
that the Council should protect them from aggression, and “that the interests 
of great and small powers in peace and security rested fundamentally upon the 
ability of the great powers to work together”.34
On 5 March 1945, the US on behalf of itself, China, the USSR and the 
UK, invited governments that had signed or adhered to the United Nations 
Declaration of 1 January 1942, and had declared war against Germany or Japan, 
to participate in the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
(UNCIO) to be held in San Francisco, beginning on 25 April 1945. At UNCIO, 
delegates worked on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, agreed in 1944 by the 
USSR, US and UK, to complete the UN Charter. The Dumbarton Oaks propos-
als embodied the idea of the five permanent members as the world’s police 
force, while immunising them from any such authority by the veto,35 which 
was further refined at the Yalta Conference of February 1945. UNCIO debates 
included a discussion of the naming of the new organisation, and it was clear 
that states deliberately chose the name as a continuation of the wartime 
alliance.36 The Treaty establishing the United Nations organisation, however, 
appeared at least to embody a stronger notion of law than its predecessor. 
Kelsen was of the opinion that the term “Charter” was more appropriate for the 
31   Tooze, supra note 15, pp. 15–16.
32   Henig, supra note 6, p. 28.
33   2nd meeting of Committee III/1 (UNCIO Doc. 130, III/1/3) p. 2.
34   Summary Report of the 5th meeting of Committee III/1 (UNCIO Doc. 263, III1/11) p. 2.
35   For the text of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals see UNCIO, vol. 3, pp. 2–17.
36   Report of the Rapporteur, Subcommittee I/1/A, Section 3, to Committee I/1 (UNCIO 
Doc. 785, I/1/27).
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“constitution of the international community” than “Covenant”, which he de-
scribed as referring to a “contractual form of the contents”.37 This was mislead-
ing according to Mazower, for whom the UN reflected a “waning confidence 
in international law as an impartial expression of civilization”.38 Furthermore, 
the Charter’s “universalizing rhetoric of freedom and rights was … a veil mask-
ing the consolidation of a great power directorate”.39
The first version of the UN Charter – the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 
1944 – was essentially directed at Germany and Japan as continuing to pose 
the greatest threat, as they were still immensely powerful (at least outward-
ly) in 1944. Hence, the idea of the world’s police forced based on the wartime 
alliance continued into the post-1945 era. German and Japanese aggression 
had clearly been planned, rather than stumbled into and, therefore, required 
executive-style government to prevent it happening again. The consensus at 
Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco wrongly assumed that the “wartime unity 
of purpose among the Great Powers would be a permanent feature of their 
international relations”.40 Thus, according to Brierly, the “desire for a system 
of security ready always for immediate action, which was a leading motive be-
hind the substitution of the Charter for the Covenant, has resulted in a sys-
tem that be jammed by the opposition of one single Great Power”.41 Tellingly, 
Brierly surmised in 1946 that “instead of limiting the sovereignty of states we 
have actually extended the sovereignty of the Great Powers, the only states 
whose sovereignty is a still a formidable reality in the modern world”.42
The UN was built on prosecuting a war against powerful states by (even 
more) powerful states, but the Second World War had fundamentally changed 
the balance of military powers so that the enemy was no longer the defeat-
ed states but would potentially come from within the alliance itself. To settle 
disputes between the new leviathans would require old fashioned diplomacy 
rather than executive action; settlements in which international law would 
play little or no role. The focus on protecting the sovereignty of the great pow-
ers meant that disputes involving them would not be settled by law, only by 
power or by adjustments to the balance of power.
37   Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 
(1950) p. 3.
38   Mazower, supra note 21, p. 16.
39   Ibid., p. 7.
40   James L. Brierly, “The Covenant and the Charter”, 23 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1946) pp. 83, 91.
41   Ibid., p. 91.
42   Ibid., p. 93.
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4 Constitutional Potential
The overriding concern to protect the sovereignty of the victorious states 
emerging from both World Wars raises the question of whether the drafters of 
the Covenant and then the Charter created organisations capable of reaching 
beyond the sovereign interests of individual states by shaping and enforcing 
a collective security system through marshalling the duties of member states. 
The Covenant was contained in the first section of the Treaty of Versailles and 
was seen not only by Wilson but also by the other two leading statesmen “as 
the key to securing a peaceful Europe and world during the years following 
the Conference”.43 Indeed, according to Wilson and Lloyd George the League 
would be the agency by which the faults in the Versailles system could be 
corrected. The idea was that the League would adjust the treaties of settle-
ment arrived at the end of the First World War in order to avoid conflict, with 
Lloyd George stressing its role to “remedy … repair and redress – the League of 
Nations will be there as a Court of Appeal to readjust crudities, irregularities, 
injustices”.44 Wilson wrote that he realised “more than ever before, that once 
established, the League can arbitrate and correct mistakes which are inevita-
ble in the treaty we are trying to make at this time”.45 According to Brierly such 
adjustments were possible as the provisions of the Covenant were “remarkably 
informal”,46 providing the potential for constitutional growth that could pro-
duce a confluence of collective security action based on the rights and duties 
of member states and the powers of the League.
More specifically, the provisions in the Covenant for peaceful settlement 
and for enforcement had this potential. Sanctions and armed force envis-
aged under Article 16 of the Covenant would pit the League and its members 
against an aggressor but, before that stage was reached, peaceful methods of 
dispute settlement should have been attempted under Article 15. At the peace-
ful settlement stage, the League would be an impartial third party, while at the 
enforcement stage it would shift to managing the duties of member states to 
take action against an aggressor. The idea of impartiality in the settlement of 
disputes is evidenced in a detailed draft produced by the French Ministerial 
commission in June 1918, which included the statement that “[t]he object of 
the League of Nations shall not be to establish an international political State. 
43   Henig, supra note 6, p. 36.
44   Ibid., p. 47.
45   Quoted in Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris 1919 (1991) p. 59.
46   James L. Brierly, “Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction”, 6 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1925) pp. 8, 15.
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It shall merely aim at the maintenance of peace by substituting Right for Might 
as the arbiter of disputes”.47
One key element in peaceful settlement of disputes by an organisation is 
the removal of any party to a dispute from blocking a collective response, in 
other words, from being a judge in its own cause. While the requirement for 
decisions of the League organs to be made unanimously appeared to be a bar-
rier to effective peaceful settlement,48 a careful reading of the Covenant shows 
that, when compared to the Charter of the United Nations, it was in some ways 
potentially more effective in preventing a member state from blocking resolu-
tions on matters in which it was involved. Article 15 of the Covenant provided 
that member states agreed to submit disputes to the Council, which “shall en-
deavour to effect a settlement of the dispute”. If unsuccessful, this resulted in 
the production of a report by the Council, either unanimously or by major-
ity vote, containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and “the recom-
mendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto”. Article 15(6) 
stated that if the report was agreed unanimously by members of the Council 
“other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, 
the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party 
to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report”. 
This was a significant departure from the basic principle of unanimity found 
in Article 5, preserving the impartiality of the Council by disregarding the 
votes of disputants, and potentially leading to enforcement under Article 16 
if a party to a dispute disregarded its recommendations. In particular, a great 
power was unable to block the adoption of a resolution that purported to ad-
dress it as a party to a dispute. As McNair pointed out, the Report generated in 
Article 15(6), “which when adopted unanimously (excluding the disputing par-
ties) has certain definite legal consequences, as has been illustrated by the dis-
pute between Italy and Abyssinia”,49 when sanctions were ultimately imposed 
by states on Italy despite its opposition. It should be remembered that Italy was 
one of the great powers in the Council of Four at the Paris Peace Conference 
and a permanent member of the League’s Council along with France, Britain 
and Japan.50 McNair’s example shows how the exclusion of disputants from 
voting under Article 15 could lead to enforcement against a recalcitrant party 
under Article 16.
47   Florence Wilson, The Origins of the League Covenant: Documentary History of Its Drafting 
(1928) p. 190.
48   Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919.
49   Arnold D. McNair, “Collective Security”, 17 British Yearbook of International Law (1936) 
pp. 150, 155.
50   Article 4(1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919.
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Furthermore, Article 16, which envisaged non-forcible and forcible mea-
sures being taken against a member state resorting to war in breach of the 
covenants, provided in paragraph 4 that any such state could be declared to be 
no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council “concurred in by the 
Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon”,51 
thereby excluding the transgressing state from blocking any measures under 
Article 16. In effect, the Covenant enabled the League to pursue dispute settle-
ment and enforcement without being stopped by the negative vote of a mem-
ber state, including those of the great powers, if such a state either was either a 
party to a dispute or had resorted to war in violation of the Covenant.52
Although these provisions of the Covenant were under-utilised, in design 
they were potentially stronger than Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. This con-
tains the right of veto for each of the five permanent members, but subject to 
the important caveat that the parties to a dispute (including any of the per-
manent members) should abstain from voting on resolutions recommending 
peaceful settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. As stated by Jenks, “par-
ties to a dispute are to abstain from voting while the Council is discharging its 
quasi-judicial function of promoting pacific settlement as distinguished from 
its political function of action for the maintenance of peace and security”.53 In 
other words, the obligation to abstain did not extend to resolutions proposed 
under Chapter VII. Nonetheless, Article 27 of the UN Charter contains a basic 
principle of natural justice that “a party to a dispute shall not be a judge of its 
own cause and shall abstain from voting”.54
However, the duty to abstain has barely touched the permanent members in 
practice in that it has been the Security Council that “not only decides whether 
a dispute has arisen but also, ultimately, who the parties to the dispute are”.55 
In effect, each permanent member has the power of veto over issues of wheth-
er there is a dispute and who the parties to it are. It is not just practice that has 
driven this, but the design of the Charter in which it is impossible to draw a 
clear line between the Security Council as corporate actor and the powers and 
51   Article 16(4) of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919.
52   There was also an amendment made by the Second Assembly of the League to Article 16, 
which if it had come into force, would have discounted the votes of the covenant breaker 
and other immediately affected states – Percy E. Corbett, “What is the League of Nations?” 
5 British Yearbook of International Law (1924) pp. 119, 125.
53   C. Wilfred Jenks, “Some Constitutional Problems of International Organizations”, 22 
British Yearbook of International Law (1945) pp. 11, 39.
54   Ben A. Wortley, “The Veto and the Security Provisions of the UN Charter”, 23 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1946) pp. 95, 102.
55   Andreas Zimmerman, “Article 27”, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2012) p. 925.
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privileges of each permanent member. Under the “chain of events” as depict-
ed by the Great Powers in explanation of the right of veto, they made it clear 
that their right of veto extended across both Chapters VI and VII UN Charter 
with with “the important proviso … for abstention from voting by parties to a 
dispute”.56 However, the design of the Charter has allowed each permanent 
member a veto over proposed resolutions purporting to tackle disputes in 
which it is a party and, furthermore, this blocking effect clearly could cover 
client countries of each permanent member.57
In design the League’s constitutional development appeared to be severely 
constrained by unanimity seemingly giving every member state a veto, but 
this was not the case. In considering the unanimity rule, Stone pointed out 
that, according to Article 4(5), member states whose interests were specially 
affected by a matter being discussed by the Council were to be invited to sit as 
a member at the relevant meeting of the Council. This signified that an invited 
state had the same rights as any other member including the right to vote.58 Its 
blocking ability, however, was curtailed by the provisions of Articles 5(2), 15(4)
(5), and Article 16(4) of the Covenant, which discounted the votes of parties to 
a dispute, as well as practice by the Council which disregarded negative votes 
in certain cases involving arbitration,59 as well as not counting abstentions as 
violating the unanimity rule.60
Furthermore, the requirement of unanimity in Article 5(1) of the Covenant 
was itself not absolute. The provision stated that “[e]xcept where otherwise 
expressly provided for in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty 
[of Versailles], decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council 
shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at 
the meeting”.61 League practice, though not entirely consistent, distinguished 
“decisions” under Article 5(1) where unanimity was required, from recom-
mendations by the Council and Assembly as well as “voeux” (expressions of 
desire) in the Assembly where majority vote was allowed.62 Although there 
were some debates in the organs of the League about the extent of the una-
nimity requirement, Stone concluded that the rule “if wisely interpreted” was 
56   UNCIO Vol. 11, p. 713.
57   Wortley, supra note 54, p. 105.
58   Julius Stone, “The Rule of Unanimity: The Practice of the Council and the Assembly of the 
League of Nations”, 14 British Yearbook of International Law (1933) pp. 18, 20. In contrast, 
under Article 31of the UN Charter an invited state does not have voting rights.
59   Stone, ibid., pp. 20–21.
60   Ibid., p. 32.
61   Article 5(1) of the League of Nations Covenant 1919.
62  Stone, supra note 58, pp. 35–7.
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not prejudicial to the activities of the Assembly or Council. “The organs of the 
League, and particularly the Council, have been reluctant to bind themselves 
more rigidly than necessary, lest they should hinder their action in unforeseen 
future contingencies”.63 Although unanimity appeared to be an insurmount-
able design fault in allowing for League action, constitutional analysis showed 
that it was not the case either under the provisions for peaceful settlement of 
disputes or for the collective enforcement of the Covenant.
5 Collective Security and Peace Through Law
There may be some doubts about whether a “Covenant”, in other words a con-
tract albeit a profound one, can deliver collective security. While a contract 
binds the member states to act together to protect each other from aggression, 
it does not provide for the exercise of collective power which can direct those 
member states towards the achievement of peace and security. Essentially 
under a contractual approach to security, the member states themselves agree 
between themselves a strategy, whereas under a collective security system an 
organisation has the function and powers to recommend or require collective 
action by member states, possibly even to require then to give up some of their 
military might for the collective good. Moreover, while a “Covenant”, indeed a 
“Charter”, may provide the legal basis for collective security, they do not neces-
sarily provide for peace through law, for example, if they allow for states to be 
judges in their own cause, or for the organisation to disregard the basic tenets 
of international law in its decisions.
Writing in the period of the League, Fenwick, argued that “collective secu-
rity” must be based on “the principle of law … that the collective judgment of 
the community of nations must replace the right of each State to be the judge 
in its own case and the collective power of the community be substituted for 
the old right of the individual State to take the law into their own hands”.64 
Fenwick wrote of the “failure of the League”, particularly the “failure of the plan 
of collective security” contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. 
He recognised that the other important functions of the League in social and 
economic activities remained “substantially unaffected by the failure of collec-
tive security”. However, these achievements appeared to Fenwick “to be of little 
consequence in the face of the inability of the League to meet the most vital 
63   Ibid., p. 42.
64   Charles G. Fenwick, “The ‘Failure’ of the League of Nations”, 30 American Journal of 
International Law (1936) pp. 506, 507.
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problem of any legal system – the maintenance of order in the international 
community and the protection of rights of person and property”.65 Fenwick’s 
explanation for the failure of the League in collective security was that it did 
not have “sufficient corporate unity to overcome the conflicts of nationalis-
tic interest within the dominant group of the Great Powers”.66 In other words, 
Fenwick was of the view that there had been insufficient concentration of col-
lective competence in the League’s organs necessary to establish an effective 
system of collective security.
Like Fenwick, McNair also commented on the collective security claims of 
the League in 1936, but his conclusions are radically different. For McNair, the 
law on the use of force, and for what became known as “collective security”, 
represented a clean break with the pre-1919 international legal order. McNair 
wrote that prior to 1919 “war itself was no illegality” meaning that the outbreak 
of war might involve the breach of a specific treaty but it remained “extra-legal 
rather than illegal”.67 The revulsion caused by the death and devastation of the 
Great War led to a fundamental change in the international legal order with a 
significant majority of states effectively pledging themselves to the principle 
of collective security even though that term did not appear in the Covenant. 
The potential of this principle had been evidenced by economic sanctions im-
posed by fifty states against Italy in 1935 for its resort to war in disregard of 
its covenants to the League: “[i]nstead of the traditional legal indifference to 
the question of responsibility for the outbreak of war there is substituted ma-
chinery for determining the party responsible and for condemning as illegal 
a resort to war without previously exhausting the machinery of the League 
for the settlement of disputes”.68 McNair assessed the balance between indi-
vidual and collective rights and duties in the new legal order: “[i]n addition 
to the traditional right and duty of individual self-defence there is created a 
collective obligation to apply economic pressure in order to restrain an illegal 
resort to war, with an option to contribute armed force if necessary”.69 The 
Covenant represented a shift to a prohibitive jus ad bellum governing unilateral 
action and a permissive collective use of force through the League: “on the one 
hand, war in breach of the Covenant is made illegal; on the other, force which 
is collectivized and placed at the service of the international community is 
made legal”.70
65   Ibid., p. 506.
66   Ibid., p. 508.
67   McNair, supra note 49, p. 152.
68   Ibid., p. 154.
69   Ibid.
70   Ibid., p. 155.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/22/2020 08:12:22AM
via free access
326 White
International Community Law Review 22 (2020) 310–330
Article 16 of the Covenant only conferred limited powers on the Council 
of the League – under Article 16(1) member states would decide whether 
sanctions were due against a member state disregarding its covenants. Under 
Article 16(2) the Council had the duty to recommend what military measures 
should be taken against a covenant-breaker in order “to protect the covenants 
of the League”, although Corbett pointed out, drawing on discussions in the 
League, that this did not prevent member states from deciding to undertake 
military action in the absence of such a recommendation: ‘the main question 
then … whether war is to be carried on, is decided not by any of the organs of 
the League but by each Member for itself ’.71 In effect, the Council of the League 
could play a recommendatory role for both sanctions and military measures 
under Article 16, but it did not replace the duties of member states from tak-
ing such measures themselves in the face of a state breaching the covenants of 
the League.72 Although this allowed significant auto-interpretive discretion for 
each member state into the Covenant system, undermining some of its appeal 
in providing peace through law, a collective judgment from the Council or in-
deed, Assembly, would enhance the legitimacy of any security measures taken 
collectively. In contrast, under the Charter scheme, the judgment of one state 
could effectively block the exercise of any collective power.
The drafting of the UN Charter was premised on remedying the defects of 
the League by transferring even greater power to the new organisation in the 
form of an executive body with the power to decide to impose sanctions or 
take military action under Chapter VII. Writing at the beginning of the UN 
period, and also looking back to its predecessor, Brierly viewed the move to-
wards greater constitutionalisation and institutionalisation in the Charter as 
fraught with problems, by a combination of the veto and the concentration of 
all significant powers in the hands of the Security Council.73
All the references in the Covenant were to the “members of the League” who 
undertook to act in certain ways except for Article 11(1), which stated that the 
“League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe-
guard the peace of nations” – dismissed as a “mere slip in drafting” by Brierly.74 
Sovereign equality for member states meant exactly that under the Covenant; 
while under the UN Charter, the move was away from a cooperative model 
of international organisation towards a crude form of world government at 
71   Corbett, supra note 52, p. 125.
72   John F. Williams, “Sanctions under the Covenant”, 17 British Year Book of International Law 
(1936) pp. 130, 141.
73   Brierly, supra note 40, p. 85.
74   Ibid.
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least in matters of peace and security. The Covenant contained the outlines 
of a constitution, enabling members to adjust the working of the Council and 
Assembly to suit, whilst the Charter contained details on the powers of each 
UN organ, in which the power to take action to preserve peace, as determined 
by the Security Council, is paramount. Universal and, if necessary, overriding 
obligations were to be created by the Security Council under Articles 25 and 
103 of the Charter, but with the purpose of tackling threats to or breaches of 
the peace not of enforcing international law. During the San Francisco confer-
ence, the New York Times observed that the smaller countries, many of which 
were devastated by war and concerned with simple survival, “reluctantly ac-
cepted the idea of virtual world dictatorship by the great powers” in return for 
having a “world organization” in which they would have some standing.75
Writing in 1947, Goodrich identified the main difference between the UN 
and the League as being the exceptional powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII. Goodrich admitted that nothing could be done against one of 
the permanent members and, therefore, the UN would have been no more 
effective in preventing the Second World War than the League.76 Those excep-
tional coercive powers were to operate outside the traditional framework of 
international law based on consent and cooperation. This is demonstrated by 
Article 1(1) of the Charter, which references collective measures for the remov-
al of threats to the peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes, but indicates 
that only the latter should be exercised in “conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law”. Executive action under Chapter VII was to be 
untrammelled by international law. Even the limited reference to international 
law and justice was inserted in Article 1 at the insistence of the US delegation 
at the San Francisco conference, specifically by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
who wanted to leave his mark on the Charter.77
The permanent members could, as envisaged by the UN Charter, control 
the agenda of the most powerful organ, and develop concepts such as “threat 
to the peace” in Article 39 in a discretionary way, so that selective enforcement 
fulfilled their common agenda in ways that could sometimes be categorised 
as the enforcement of universal laws. For example, in the Korean War in the 
1950s, the lack of centralisation of the US-led military effort did not prevent 
the relevant actors, including the Secretary-General, from proclaiming the op-
eration as a UN effort to combat lawlessness: “I am conscious of the nobility 
75   New York Times, 7 May 1945.
76   Leland M. Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations”, 1 International 
Organization (1947), pp. 3, 10.
77   Schlesinger, supra note 13, p. 161.
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and surpassing significance of United Nations police action in Korea, in which 
sixteen Member nations actively have taken part. It has been the first deter-
mined stand against international lawlessness and aggression which peace-
loving nations of the world have taken”.78 Even “sanctions”, which are normally 
conceptualized legally as measures taken in response to breaches of the law, 
are imposed in the UN system primarily to address threats to the peace.
The UN has survived because of the total defeat of Germany and Japan en-
abled universal membership to be achieved, something that the League sin-
gularly failed to do. The Charter’s privileging of power in the Security Council 
(and associated treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968) 
help to explain the UN’s longevity. Beyond this: “What started out as a mecha-
nism for defending and adapting empire in an increasingly nationalist age has 
turned into a global club of national states, devoid of any substantial strategic 
purpose beyond the almost forgotten one of preventing another world war”.79 
The fact that the Charter was clearly based on the power politics of the post 
second world war period, and that it has helped cement those configurations 
of power, explain its survival but, unfortunately, it does not signify an advance-
ment in international law. While the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4) of 
the Charter appears normatively stronger than the guarantee against aggres-
sion in Article 10 of the Covenant, the absence of any possible institutional 
response to great power infractions undermines its ability to deliver peace 
through law.
Brierly saw both Charter and Covenant as constitutions, and he took a con-
stitutionalist view of them at least in terms of practice so that they would be 
“overlaid with precedents and conventions which change them after a time into 
something very different”.80 As with all constitutions, the future development 
of the Charter could not be fully predicted in 1945, and the changes brought 
by the vast increase in member states representing the first real move towards 
universal membership, have enabled a form of universal lawmaking not fully 
envisaged in 1945. There were, however, some signs at San Francisco that the 
desire of the smaller nations to have an organisation and, moreover, one with 
a plenary organ where each state, powerful or weak had an equal say, would 
give rise to the opportunity to shape international relations. In formulating 
the text of what became Article 10 of the Charter, the discussion at UNCIO was 
to confer upon the General Assembly the power to discuss any matter “within 
78   Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (1954), p. 366.
79   Mazower, supra note 21, p. 27.
80   Brierly, supra note 40, p. 83.
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the sphere of international relations”.81 Although the final text was amended 
to read “within the scope of the Charter”, the Australian delegate expressed the 
shared view that this was not a significant difference: “That scope will include 
every aspect of the Charter, everything contained in and everything covered by 
it. It will include the Preamble of the Charter, the great purposes and principles 
embodied in it, the activities of all its organs; and the right of discussion will be 
free and untrammelled and will range over that tremendous area”.82 Of most 
significance for international law-making is Article 13(1)(a), which empowered 
the Assembly to make recommendations for the purpose of “encouraging the 
development of international law and its codification”. At San Francisco this 
received little specific attention, though it was part of the push back by small-
er states against the dominance of the organisation by the Security Council 
and its permanent members. While these states had little choice but to accept 
the Dumbarton Oaks version of the Security Council, they managed to secure 
greater competence for the General Assembly. Kelsen struggled to tie the rec-
ommendatory competence in Article 13(1)(a) back to the purposes of the UN 
except to say that such recommendations would be “measures to strengthen 
universal peace”.83 In reality, they allowed the Assembly to reassert the value 
of law, and offset to a limited degree the dominance of security concerns over 
law in the Charter.
6 Concluding Remarks
The balance between the sovereignty of states and the competence of the or-
ganisation achieved in the Covenant of 1919 seemed to be firmly in favour of 
sovereign states: this is because of the predominance of members’ rights and 
duties as well as the requirement for unanimity in decisions by League organs, 
thereby seemingly excluding independence of League action. This, combined 
with a concern to put mainly procedural hurdles in the way of potential aggres-
sors so as to prevent the sort of descent into war that occurred in 1914, provided 
some narrow indications of an approach to peace based on law, but did not 
suggest the constitutional potential to create a functioning collective security 
system. However, the provisions of the Covenant were flexible providing the 
potential for constitutional growth that could have produced a confluence of 
collective security action based on the rights and duties of member states and 
81   Committee II/2 (UNCIO Doc. 686, II/2/34).
82   4th meeting of Commission II (UNCIO Doc. 1151, II/17) p. 19.
83   Kelsen, supra note 37, p. 215.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/22/2020 08:12:22AM
via free access
330 White
International Community Law Review 22 (2020) 310–330
the powers of the League. Flickers of this potential, were seen with the imposi-
tion of sanctions against Italy for its invasion of Abyssinia, but they were not 
nurtured into a fully functioning collective security system.
Furthermore, by exploring the League’s broad competence in peace and 
security, member states could have built a greater deterrent to potential ag-
gressors. While its collective security potential remained underexplored, it is 
clear that the Covenant and the League had greater potential to address the 
growing threats than is commonly the view. Moreover, the flaws in its make-
up, for example by its lack of clarity on the sanctioning powers of the League 
in Article 16 of the Covenant, were not remedied by the drafters of the UN 
Charter; instead they were compounded by dramatically shifting the balance 
between members’ duties and institutional powers towards the organisation 
and away from member states. Under the Covenant the duties of member 
states to take collective security action were not dependent upon a Council 
decision, whereas under the Charter the obligations on member states to take 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII are dependent upon a decision of 
the Security Council, in other words dependent upon the decision of each per-
manent member. Those decisions are unaccountable to the membership or to 
the International Court of Justice and they embody an approach to collective 
security that is the antithesis to peace through law. As made clear by Brierly: 
“we have been led into a cul-de-sac by the over-hasty pursuit of a perfectionist 
policy, and by a too shallow diagnosis of the causes of failure of the League. By 
insisting that only an institution which has the power to decide can act effec-
tively we have created one that can neither decide nor act”.84
84   Brierly, supra note 40, p. 93.
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